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“One hundred and ninety heads of state; nine are women. Of all the 
people in parliament in the world, 13% are women. In the corporate 
sector, women at the top, C-level jobs, board seats, tops out at 15-
16%. The numbers have not moved since 2002, and are going in the 
wrong direction.” 
Sheryl Sandberg (CEO of Facebook) speech to TED, Washington DC 
(Guardian, 25.01.12) 
 
"I am deeply concerned that the gender pay gap has barely fallen over 
the last 15 years and in some countries it is even increasing." 
Viviane Reding (EU Commissioner for Fundamental Rights) launching 
a campaign for pay equality (Brussels, 10.03.10) 
 
Our 2009 article in BJIR reported on findings from an earlier comparative 
study which looked at how work-life balance policies were implemented in 
organisations in two sectors, insurance and social work, in two European 
countries, France and Britain. Two preliminary remarks are relevant here in 
terms of how our findings fit with the workshop on gender equality bargaining.  
 
First, our research used the terminology of work-life balance (and within this 
frame, distinguished between family-friendly measures and flexibility 
measures): we were interested in how policies (and understanding of these 
policies in practice) were framed, whether as stand-alone policies or as 
components of wider sets of policies, in practical terms on working time (often 
in the French but less so in the British context) and/or on gender equality 
(sometimes, in both national contexts, but with marked variations between 
organisational settings).So, as in Sue Williamson‟s work (e.g. 2009, 2010), 
there is room to interrogate the relationship between gender equality, work-life 
balance, and family-friendly or family-supportive measures. Of course, these 
issues are linked but the way in which they are framed deserves attention and 
is likely to influence outcomes. 
 
Second, we noticed that even when we as investigators framed the question 
of work-life balance in gender neutral terms, respondents (whether HR 
officers or trade union representatives) often spontaneously framed their 
response in gendered terms and that the outcome of ostensibly gender-
neutral measures was strongly gendered in practice. Our findings thus echoed 
other work which notes that organisational policies may have gendered 
effects which are not always conducive to gender equality. 
 
Our 2009 article focused specifically on the activities of trade union 
representatives within our case study organisations and at the level of 
national policy (sectoral and peak), and made four sets of observations, 
based on the findings from our project: first, trade union policies were strongly 
influenced by wider gender cultures within each trade union, according to the 
accounts provided by the national-level representatives; second, these 
policies were linked both at national policy level and on the ground locally with 
wider issues of trade union renewal, including tactical use of partnership (in 
the public sector) and bargaining (see also Rigby and O‟Brien-Smith, 2010); 
third, trade union responses were shaped principally by the opportunity 
structures provided by legislative and other pressures on the organisation; 
and fourth, that unions very rarely took the initiative or had substantial 
leverage (apart from some flagship initiatives which were widely promoted by 
the unions as part of their bargaining “toolkits”) but took advantage of these 
opportunity structures where they were available.  
 
This workshop provides us with a chance to reflect further on our earlier work, 
in light of more recent research and on initiatives and assessments in both 
countries and more broadly at European level.  
 
Mike Rigby and Fiona O‟Brien-Smith (2010) point out that since our research 
was carried out the work-life balance agenda has been strongly promoted in 
the UK and we would therefore expect to see an increase in gender equality 
awareness and in concrete actions to promote gender equality. In the French 
context too, as we will see, important new initiatives to promote equality 
bargaining were adopted in the mid-2000s. So in both countries, we would 
expect to see an increase in equality bargaining, and if the bargaining is 
effective we would also expect to see a positive impact on indicators of 
gender equality. 
 
In both countries, indeed, there is evidence of increased activity around 
gender equality bargaining. In the UK, the absence of any statutory 
requirement to bargain – or even (as e.g. in Australia) for workers to be 
consulted and included on employment equity committees (Blackett & 
Sheppard, 2003) – means that there is no reliable, centrally collected indicator 
of the number of agreements on gender equality. But the Trade Union 
Congress‟s annual equality audits show a rise in the number of unions taking 
part in activities which are either about recruiting women, black and ethnic 
minority workers, disabled workers, and LGBT workers and/or ensuring that 
members in those social groups are adequately represented within the union 
(internal activities) as well as those engaged in workplace bargaining on 
equality (external activities). Over two fifths of unions now have provision for 
the nomination of equality reps (TUC, 2011; see also Kirton, 2011). 
 
In France, the number of equality agreements is monitored nationally and 
shows a rise since 2006 when a new requirement to bargain on reducing the 
gender pay gap was introduced. However, in both countries the evidence of 
concrete outcomes is very limited. Even where equality bargaining is 
underpinned by statutory obligations, as in France, whole sectors are still not 
covered by bargaining, and the government notes that the number of 
agreements overall is disappointing, rising to only 7.23% of all sectoral 
agreements in 2009 and 5.6% of all company-level agreements (in 2008). Pay 
bargaining tackled gender equality in less than 10% of cases. Moreover, the 
process showed little sign of sustainability over a longer period, with few new 
cases emerging (the later agreements often taking the form of extensions of 
the previous year‟s) (Ministère du Travail, 2009). Even where bargaining 
takes place, there is a general feeling that bargaining often remains an “empty 
shell” in the sense that it lays down a commitment to gender equality without 
specifying precise objectives, timetables, or mechanisms (Meilland, 2010). 
 
Regarding the broader gender equality outcomes, the evidence is similarly 
mixed. The gender pay gap appears to be closing very slowly year on year in 
both countries, with a more significant change in the UK in the last few years.1 
In both countries, however, the gender pay gap at the level of executive pay, 
is stubbornly high, and in France there are signs that it is growing (CIPD, 
2011; Meilland, 2010). In the UK, progress on equal pay has been made from 
a relatively poor starting point, and is fragile as it is largely driven by pay deals 
in the public sector2 which are about to be swept away by public sector pay 
freezes and job cuts. 
 
Three broad questions are therefore raised: 
 
1. what is the relationship between gender equality bargaining and 
gender equality outcomes, and how can these be explained? 
 
2. more generally, can equality bargaining make a difference or is it just 
an “empty shell” (Hoque & Noon, 2004)? 
 
3. what is the capacity of the actors in the workplace to effect change, 
and can it be enhanced? 
 
These questions highlight two central paradoxes identified by Trevor Colling 
and Linda Dickens (1998) and picked up more recently by Linda Briskin 
(2006): state retreat has made collective bargaining more important as a 
vehicle for achieving equality, but has also served to undermine it; the need 
for union renewal has encouraged unions to promote equality internally (in 
their recruitment strategies and organisational policies and practices) and 
externally, but this process has created new internal tensions and exposed 
internal and external weaknesses. 
 
Gender equality bargaining covers a range of interrelated workplace policies 
and practices. For British unions, for example, equal pay is the main priority of 
equality bargaining, for the British TUC (Kirton, 2010) as for other European 
unions (EIROnline, 2010). Other related priorities, according to the TUC‟s 
2009 report, are parental rights (51% of trade unions reported success); 
flexible working and work–life balance (44%); age (37%); disability (35%); and 
                                                 
1
 It is difficult to compare across both countries using nationally produced statistics, as they use 
different measures (British national statistics use median wages, which give a lower gender pay gap, 
rather than the more usual mean wage measure). Eurostat figures from 2009 show the EU-27 average at 
17%, with France very slightly below average and the UK significantly higher at 21%. The unadjusted 
Eurostat figures confirm significant recent change for the UK (down from 24.3% in 2005) but suggest 
that the gender gap in France, which was already below the EU average, has seen little recent change. 
 
2
 The ETUC’s recent draft report, although not exhaustive, tends to confirm this analysis as the three 
key agreements highlighted are all in the public sector. See Crawford, 2012  (we would like to thank 
the ETUC for kindly providing us with a copy of this document and allowing us to cite it here). 
race equality (35%) (Kirton, 2010). EIRO‟s (2010) survey of recent social 
partner activities suggests that trade unions are more likely than employers to 
take the initiative on gender equality. A large proportion of these activities are 
awareness-raising campaigns. Unions are also increasingly likely to have 
established regular (often annual) national-level reporting and monitoring 
exercises on gender equality. Finally, a significant number of unions are 
actively engaged in training of their own officials and lay representatives on 
gender equality. 
 
Employers on the other hand tend to see gender equality as resulting from 
factors external to the workplace such as socialisation and education, 
although a growing number of initiatives are reported particularly around work-
life balance and support for childcare (as we noted above, these are likely to 
increase rather than diminish gender segregation), as well as measures to 
promote increased numbers of women in senior positions. 
The EIRO report also finds that bargaining on gender equality takes place 
primarily in multi-employer (sectoral or national) rather than single-employer 
settings, and takes the form of framework agreements. This is likely to have 
an impact on outcomes: as noted earlier, these general agreements give 
considerable leeway for firms to escape obligations or to interpret them freely, 
and also allow for individual discretion in implementation which has been 
identified, as noted above, as reducing equality of outcomes. It has therefore 
been suggested that employers may engage in equality bargaining as an 
alternative to “harder”, i.e. enforceable, action, in which case agreements are 
more likely to be marginalised (and therefore eroded by the weight of other 
organisational practices) or dependent on the action of individuals (and 
therefore easily overturned if those individuals leave) (EIRO, 2010). Overall, 
then, bargaining which is primarily a response to legislative pressure or a 
means of forestalling it is likely to be an empty shell. 
It has also been suggested that policies framed in terms of diversity rather 
than addressing the wider issues raised by a focus on equality tend to narrow  
the bargaining agenda (Ashley, 2010; Laufer, 2003; Noon, 2007) to one of 
anti-discrimination (for example, training interview panellists) rather than 
addressing the fundamental reasons why groups of workers are trapped in 
low-skill jobs, held back from promotion, or prevented from achieving their full 
potential at work. 
Even where formal policies are put in place by statutory means or by 
collective agreement, they are less effective where there is a high level of 
discretion for local line managers and supervisors. Our findings regarding the 
importance of line managers have more recently been confirmed by Burnett et 
al (2010). However, the recent Ballarin report in France has suggested that 
equality bargaining can help foster a more holistic approach where, in some 
large companies at least, line managers undergo training in people-centred 
management and staff are encouraged to raise work-life balance as part of 
their personal development in the context of appraisal (Ballarin, 2012). 
The differential capacity of trade unions and employers to raise issues and set 
the agenda therefore appears crucial to understanding the limited impact of 
the gender equality bargaining agenda. Put simply, trade unions are too weak 
to influence the broader framework of organisational policies and policies. Gill 
Kirton notes, on the basis of WERS 2004 data, that although unions can be 
demonstrated to have a positive outcome on equality policies, they are not 
even informed or consulted on such policies in most cases (Kirton, 2010). 
Unions not always able to translate equality into wider campaigns, or to get 
leverage in bargaining. Bargaining agendas are usually restricted (Kirton, 
2011: 36) and unions may have difficulty in mobilising support in the 
workforce (Ibid: 37). Employers often want to “do it their way” without union 
involvement, and unions report that employers are currently more reluctant 
than in 2005 to bargain on equality. 
The capacity of trade unions to raise and pursue equality issues is related 
both to internal factors and to external factors, notably their strength in relation 
to employers and their skill as negotiators. Much of the literature on equality 
bargaining has focused on the internal factors, particularly the question of 
whether unions are willing to raise gender equality issues or remain 
entrenched in more traditional male concerns and practices. As Kirton 
acknowledges, trade union membership has become more feminised so that 
women constitute at least as many members as men in many countries (52% 
in UK, 44% in Australia), even if they are still under-represented in posts of 
responsibility within unions.  
 
French unions are less feminised (the CFDT with nearly 46% has the highest 
proportion of female members, with the biggest confederation CGT at only 
34% in 2010, up from 28% in 2006) and the equality officers we interviewed 
recognised this as a problem. Jacqueline Laufer writing in 2003 attributed the 
weakness of equality bargaining to under-investment by social actors on the 
ground. The trend towards feminisation of union membership and bargaining 
representatives appears to have accompanied other factors driving the 
equality bargaining agenda rather than being the main factor in itself, and 
there are signs that the development of external and internal pressures for 
equality bargaining can encourage change within unions. 
 
This does not mean a straightforward or overnight change of union cultures 
and practices. Pascal Bernard, CEO of Eau de Paris, claimed at a high-profile 
symposium on company equality policies in France in 2006 that bargaining 
had to be suspended in his company due to differences of opinion between 
male and female union negotiators (ORSE, 2006). Rather, tensions within 
unions over equality strategies may be seen as part of a process of wider 
change as well as reflecting uncertainty about the right way to renew practices 
in a highly unfavourable climate (see e.g. Kullander and Björklund 2011 on 
the Swedish case). 
 
In our 2009 article we highlighted the link between the development of an 
equality bargaining agenda and trade union renewal. For example, we noted 
the link between bargaining on work-life balance and the partnership agenda. 
Unions are likely to engage in qualitative issues such as equality and work-life 
balance where there are mutual gains to be had (see also Williamson, 2010).  
Samuel and Bacon (2010) have questioned this cooperative bargaining 
agenda, arguing that in the British case where they are not buttressed by 
strong statutory arrangements, partnership agreements will be hollow shells 
reflecting an imbalance of power. Family-friendly policies accounted for 18% 
of the agreements they surveyed, but they dismiss such agreements as 
dealing with “non-core” issues and lacking in substance. Rigby and O‟Brien-
Smith (2011) similarly query the idea of a shift towards integrative bargaining 
in the print and media industry. However, it is important not to dichotomise 
“old” (hostile, pay-related) and “new” (cooperative or integrative) logics and 
modes of bargaining: as Williamson (2011) shows, equality bargaining can 
follow a number of paths which may combine hostile and cooperative modes. 
The more recent literature on trade union renewal (see e.g. Gall, 2009) has 
emphasised the diversity of renewal strategies and the need in many 
circumstances to draw tactically on a range of repertoires. Of course, this very 
diversity can also be a source of weakness in some ways – by creating the 
possibility of confusion and inviting disagreements over strategy - and is in 
itself a reflection of weakness.  
 
But it may also open up new possibilities for renewal. As Christian Levesque 
and Gregor Murray (2010) argue, union revitalisation may less be about 
shifting from one strategic choice to another than about developing linkages - 
substantively and organisationally – and the ability to manage such linkages. 
Organisationally, their argument recalls Nicky Le Feuvre‟s point about the 
weakness of French trade unions in developing links with grassroots women‟s 
organisations. Substantively, their argument corroborates Briskin‟s call (2006, 
and see Lim et al, 2002) for a multi-pronged equality bargaining strategy. 
 
The ETUC‟s (2012) study of collective bargaining on the gender pay gap 
highlights, alongside the feminisation of trade union leadership, two key sets 
of variables: the first set relates to collective bargaining structures (degree of 
centralisation) and coverage, and the second to the nature and extent of 
supportive legislation to support bargaining processes. Our comparison of 
France and the UK corroborates this analytical framework. In Britain, the 
erosion of collective bargaining coverage (alongside union density ) and the 
dominance of decentralised (single employer) bargaining means equality 
bargaining has been limited outside the public sector, although pockets of 
innovation have emerged. Overall, it means equality bargaining is very fragile. 
Samuel and Bacon (2010) argue, following Adams (1995), that progressive 
change in employment relations requires state action, without which any 
bargaining process is unlikely to be effective. Their analysis follows other work 
which indicates that equality bargaining is most effective where it is supported 
by legislation (Briskin, 2006, and see Cook et al, 1992; Kumar, 1993). This 
argument may respond to an anglophone bargaining environment. 
 
However, it has also been noted that over-reliance on legislation can weaken 
bargaining (Briskin, 2006, and see Kravaritou, 1997, based on a continental 
European overview) and that bargaining presents several advantages over 
statutory approaches, notably a broader perspective and more room for 
creative local innovations. If the UK case highlights the first of these two 
points, the French case illustrates the second. In France, the exceptionally 
high rate of bargaining coverage (around 98%) masks exceptionally low 
density rates and weak union presence, showing instead heavy reliance on 
state action both to initiate and to monitor change. 
 
Quantitatively, bargaining in France is more developed than in the UK. A law 
adopted in 2006 establishes principles of gender equality and sets objectives 
for the social partners. Bargaining on equality and diversity is now an 
obligation for companies, alongside bargaining on other issues such as pay, 
working conditions and working time. At sectoral level, the number of 
agreements rose from 33 in 2007 (3.2% of the total number of agreements 
made at this level) to 167 (13.5%) in 2011. At company level, a similar but 
slightly slower pace of increase in the intensity of bargaining took place: from 
1214 (4.4% of the total) in 2007 to 3173 (12%) in 2011 (Ministère du Travail, 
2012: 7). The 2006 law (based on a 2004 framework agreement at national 
level) set the specific – and extremely ambitious - objective of removing 
gender pay gaps by December 2010 by means of annual pay bargaining. 
Quite clearly, however, this key objective has not been met, and significant 
gaps remain, as noted above.  
 
The French equality and anti-discrimination body HALDE carried out its own 
survey of businesses in 2008, finding that 37% of companies reported having 
adopted gender equality measures but observing that such measures usually 
failed to consider causes of inequality and tended to assume a masculine 
career model. Fewer than half of companies in their survey had taken part in 
equality bargaining, despite it being a legal obligation to do so. The bulk of 
measures undertaken were limited to support for women returning from 
maternity leave and awareness-raising campaigns aimed at encouraging 
women to apply for promotion. Measures to develop women‟s access to 
training was seen as particularly weak, and (as noted by others) companies 
tended to focus on support for high-flying women. Instead, HALDE argued 
that effective policies depended on strict anti-discrimination measures, and 
commitment to moving towards parity across all areas of employment, 
focusing in particular on recruitment, career development and promotion; 
training; pay; and working conditions. Nevertheless, HALDE was able to 
identify several examples of good practice, usually limited to one or two 
discrete areas, such as support for home-working and policy on holding 
meetings (L‟Oréal: see also the very recent Ballarin report which highlights 
good practice at L‟Oréal), extended support for paternity leave and 
awareness-raising campaigns to support new fathers (BNP-Paribas) (HALDE, 
2009). Equality bargaining appears to have become relatively well established 
in the largest French companies (Ministère du Travail, 2012: 8), which cover a 
large proportion of the workplace and which can act as showcases for the 
benefits of workplace equality measures, but this still leaves most companies 
unaffected, creating further disparities between employees. 
 
Noting the disappointing response to the 2006 law, and following up the Grésy 
report which in July 2011 had made a series of recommendations for work-life 
balance (focusing particularly on maternity, paternity and parental leave), the 
French government decided in November 2010 to introduce a penalty 
(applicable from January 2012) of up to 1% of salary costs for companies 
which failed to bargain on gender equality or at least to put in place an action 
plan for bargaining, based on monitoring by the labour inspectorate (ORSE, 
2012). This new provision, if effectively policed, is likely to see a dramatic rise 
in equality bargaining by shifting the balance of incentives from inaction 
towards specified outcomes (although as in other countries the under-
resourcing of the labour inspectorate may limit implementation). Moreover, as 
Laufer (2003, and see also Meilland, 2010) pointed out, recent moves to 
introduce new leave arrangements are likely to create a more supportive 
environment for equality bargaining. The new Socialist Party administration 
made workplace equality one of its priority areas and it featured as one of 
seven key areas for discussion at the “grand social conference” which marked 
the beginning of the presidency in July 2012, in line with François Hollande‟s 
presidential campaign commitment.  
 
Three final remarks on the French case tend to support the idea of equality 
bargaining, however weak, contributing to longer term change. First, in line 
with Briskin‟s (2006) arguments, there is some evidence that it may open up a 
space for innovative agreements: for example, the CGT‟s recent agreement 
with a Nice-based hotel to award parental leave benefits to same-sex parents. 
Second, there are signs that equality demands have been integrated into 
other bargaining and campaigning agendas: for example, the big 
confederation‟s campaigning on stress in the highly-publicised of France 
Télécom has also highlighted the need for a gender equality strategy and 
helped to further the renegotiation of an earlier agreement there. Third, 
despite the weaknesses and tensions within the equality bargaining process 
in France, a public debate on how to support working parents and how to 
reduce gender inequalities has been launched. Top-level (national, inter-
sectoral): trade unions and employers‟ associations sit on the Haut Conseil de 
la Famille, and contributed to the 2012 Ballarin report. In this latter context, 
Laurence Laigo (CFDT confederal secretary) argued that “we need to 
reposition equality at the heart of the issues that are decisive for companies 
today and conduct holistic bargaining on equality, the quality of working life 
and work-life balance”, but at the same time to have precise indicators to 
measure progress, so that equality “doesn‟t get watered down in all the other 
issues” (Ballarin, 2012: 24-25). All of these points support the idea that a 
longer-term process of equality bargaining has been opened and will be 
carried forward under the Hollande presidency. 
 
However, an important countervailing feature of much policy intervention 
around the work-life interface is that gender differentiation in the name of 
equality can have negative effects, most obviously by encouraging 
occupational segregation by gender (see Dex, 2010). This policy conundrum 
is particularly pertinent in France which any move towards equality bargaining 
needs to recognise. Women are highly concentrated in low-paid sectors and 
in part-time work, which is linked to more unfavourable pay and conditions (as 
shown by the fact that women are likely to receive less pay for overtime than 
men) (Ministère du Travail, 2012: 12). 
 
What will be the impact of changes in the economic and political climate? Our 
research was carried out well before the onset of economic crisis. Colling and 
Dicken‟s (1998) case study of British Gas showed that equality bargaining can 
be quickly sunk under the weight of economic imperatives, with trade unions 
“running to catch up”. Judy Fudge (2000: cited by Briskin, 2006: 13) points out 
that equality bargaining is threated by two features of restructuring: attacks on 
the public sector, and downward pressures on wages leading to a polarised 
pay structure.  
 
At European level, the blockage of proposals on maternity leave – part of the 
2008 Work-Life Balance package – reflects intense employer lobbying on 
grounds of costs as well as a shift to the right (not least in the UK, which is 
attempting to build alliances to block social legislation). It has also been 
suggested that, in the Australian case at least, gender equality outcomes 
(measured by domestic division of labour) were related to the policies of 
governments in office (Craig, Mullan and Blaxland, 2010). They attribute a 
reversal of a previous trend towards convergence between fathers‟ and 
mothers‟ paid and unpaid work to the Conservative government‟s fiscal 
support for single earner households on one hand, and ideological promotion 
of motherhood on the other.  
 
Nevertheless, this very brief review of recent European developments 
suggests that the equality bargaining agenda is likely to progress further even 
as it is constrained by state and economic restructuring. In the process, it has 
raised some internal tensions which are likely to intensify. The paradoxes of 
gender equality bargaining persist. In all national contexts, the need for 
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